Author-Kumar Sameer
Law College Dehradun


Recognition of States in international law is a political act based on interests and assessments made by states individually. However, in granting recognition, it is the legal arguments that must prevail. The recognizing State should base its decision on a legal framework which makes the act of recognition valid and credible. At the same time, such political decision supported by legal arguments may in no way threaten international peace and security, and may not be in collision with the peremptory norms of international law. Following is a paper on recognition of States in international law as seen from the aspect of international peace and stability. The primary objective of the international community, particularly since the establishment of the United Nations Organization, has been the maintenance of peace and security in the world. Therefore, the international recognition of entities that have demonstrated wide and strong capacity to be states, and whose attitude has been to serve the greater interests of peace, security, harmony and prosperity among people, must be a principled decision, not conditioned by mere political interests. International recognition of states is a precondition for the prosperity of new states. As such, it must obtain the status of a stabilizing instrument of new entities as well. When it comes to small states, this act is even more significant, for it secures and protects them from potential threats, hence strengthening the commitment for peace and stability. Recognition must become a catalyst and incentive for a quicker, more efficient and full-fledged euro-integrating process, which is crucial for preserving long-term stability, functioning democracy and peace and understanding among people.


The competing theories of state recognition and their failings actively demonstrate that recognition of a state does not have any normative con- tent per se, but rather, that the rules of state recognition, although legal rules, are legal vehicles for political choices. We have the dilemma of concurrently wanting the right cases to result in independent states while prohibiting the wrong ones from becoming so, and so we sail between political choices, using the language of law. The state is neither truly free to recognize another entity nor entirely bound. Differing cases require different legal criteria and different legal results. This flexibility in state recognition theory though, while depriving the act of any inherent legal meaning, has value in its utility for establishing lawful relationships.

The competing theories of state recognition and their failings actively demonstrate that recognition of a state does not have any normative con- tent per se, but rather, that the rules of state recognition, although legal rules, are legal vehicles for political choices. We have the dilemma of concurrently wanting the right cases to result in independent states while prohibiting the wrong ones from becoming so, and so we sail between political choices, using the language of law. The state is neither truly free to recognize another entity nor entirely bound. Differing cases require different legal criteria and different legal results. This flexibility in state recognition theory though, while depriving the act of any inherent legal meaning, has value in its utility for establishing lawful relationships.

To recognize a community as a State is to declare that it fulfils the conditions of statehood as required by international law. If these conditions are present, existing States are under the duty to grant recognition. In the absence of an international organ competent to ascertain and authoritatively to declare the presence of requirements of full international personality, States already establishedfulfil that function in their capacity as organs of international law. In thus acting they administer the law of nations. This rule of law signifies that in granting or withholding recognition States do not claim and are not entitled to serve exclusively the interests of their national policy and convenience regardless of the principles of international law in the matter. Although recognition is thus declaratory of an existing fact, such declaration, made in the impartial fulfilment of a legal duty, is constitutive, as between the recognizing State and the new community, of international rights and duties associated with full statehood. Prior to recognition such rights and obligations exist only to the extent to which they have been expressly conceded or legitimately asserted by reference to compelling rules of humanity and justice, either by the existing members of international society or by the community claiming recognition.,

These principles are believed to have been accepted by the preponderant practice of States. They are also considered to represent rules of con- duct most consistent with the fundamental requirements of international law conceived as a system of law. However, while followed in practice with some regularity, they cannot be regarded as having been uniformly acted upon or clearly perceived by governments. Neither have they secured the assent of the majority of writers on the subject.


The majority of writers still adhere to the view that the act of recognition as such is not a matter governed by law, but a question of policy. They urge that recognition is the result of a decision taken not in obedience to a legal duty, but in pursuance of the exigencies of national interest. If this is so, it will be asked, how is it that recognition looms so large in the writings of those very jurists who hold that it is outside the law? The answer is that, while denying the quality of law to the act of recognition, some of them maintain that this act of policy, once accomplished, entails legal consequences inasmuch as it is the starting point of international personality with all the rights pertaining thereto; that, in any case, the form and the circumstances of recognition are of legal interest and necessitate the consideration of such questions as the distinction between de jure and de facto recognition, implied recognition, and conditional recognition; and that important questions of law arise when that act of policy constitutes so-called premature recognition in disregard of the rights of existing States. But the dominant fact remains that the very commencement of the international personality of States and their legal right to existence are declared by these writers to be outside the orbit of international law.

This fact has been obscured by the circumstance that the problem of recognition of States has been identified with the controversy between the rival doctrines of the declaratory and the constitutive character of recognition. The opposition of these two doctrines has for a long time dominated discussion on the subject. Both theories have denied that recognition is a matter of legal duty in relation to the community which claims it. The constitutive theory, as commonly propounded, culminates in two assertions. The first is that prior to recognition the community in question possesses neither the rights nor the obligations which international law associates with full statehood; the second is that recognition is a matter of absolute political discretion as distinguished from a legal duty owed to the community concerned. These two assertions, it will be shown, are not inconsistent. The theory of the declaratory nature of recognition fully accepts the view of its rival that there does not exist in any circumstances a legal duty to grant recognition. At the same time, with an obvious lack of consistency, it maintains that prior to recognition the nascent community exists as a State and is entitled to many of the most important attributes of statehood. This means, upon analysis, that the newcomer is entitled as a matter of legal right to claim what are usually regarded as the normal legal consequences of recognition, but that it is not entitled to claim recognition as such. The apparent logical difficulty has been thought to be met by dint of the assertion--which is contrary to the practice of governments and of courts-that the only meaning of recognition is a political declaration of willingness to enter into normal diplomatic relations. This questionable solution has been regarded as preferable to accepting the main tenet of the constitutive doctrine according to which a purely discretionary political act of recognition is creative of substantive rights-indeed, of the very existence- of statehood.

The denial of the legal nature of recognition, that is, the denial of the existence of a duty to recognize and of a right to recognition, notwithstanding the presence of requisite factual conditions, is grounded in the same attitude which has brought into being the orthodox constitutive doctrine. It is the attitude congenial to the type of positivism current in the literature of international law. If, in conformity with positivist teaching,the will of the State is the sole source of its obligations, then it is impossible to concede that the existing States can have new duties thrust upon them as the result of the emergence of a politically organized com- munity which they are henceforth bound to recognize as a State.

It would have been natural for those adhering to the declaratory doc- trine to feel no hesitation in accepting the view of recognition as a juridical act performed in the fulfilment of a legal duty. For there is but one step-which is certainly not a revolutionary one-between maintaining that an act is merely declaratory of a fact of primary importance in the life of a nation and treating that act as one of legal duty. However, such is the lure of respectability, which has attached to the positivist creed, that most of those holding the declaratory view have felt it incumbent upon them to join the opposing doctrine in denying the legal nature of the act of recognition and in finding in such denial the hallmark of positivist orthodoxy.[1]

The Place of Recognition in the Relations of States.

Concentration on the dispute between the constitutive and the declaratory doctrines as well as the tendency to apply positivist method also in this branch of inter- national law have been responsible for the present unsatisfactory state of the law of recognition. The practice of States, after allowance has been made for discrepancies due to the political implications of the function of recognition, supplies a satisfactory basis for conceiving and presenting the process of recognition in all its manifestations as an act of law as distinguished from policy. From that practice it is possible to extract legal principles capable of general application. There ought to be no doubt as to the urgency and the intrinsic justification of such principles. For the problem of recognition touches the life of States in its most vital aspects. It confronts it in the form of recognition of state- hood at the point of its emergence into the international arena; it faces the State in the form of recognition of governments at times of internal and external crises brought about by a revolutionary break in the legal continuity of its constitutional existence; and it confronts it in the shape of recognition of belligerency at periods of violent commotions when on the battlefields of civil war the nation seeks a solution of violent clashes of creed and interests. Yet, notwithstanding its obvious significance, recognition, as taught by writers, constitutes one of the weakest links in international law. The science of international law can no longer avoid the task of inquiring whether this state of affairs is due to a clear defect of international law as expressed in the practice of States or whether it is attributable to the failure of lawyers to analyze constructively the practice of States by reference to a jurisprudential principle of order as distinguished from amorphous maxims of policy. An inquiry of this nature is of special urgency at a time when the foundations are being laid of an improved international order.

There is an instructive analogy in this matter between recognition and the place of war in international law. Thus, prior to the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928, theadmissibility of war as an instrument both for enforcing and for changing the law constituted the principal defect of the law of nations. In time of peace States were rig- idly bound to respect the existence, the independence, and even the dignity of other members of international society. Recourse to reprisals was regulated by principles circumscribing the conditions and the extent of their application. But by availing itself of its unlimited right to declare war the State could gain entire freedom from these restraints and acquire the right to treat its neighbour thus attacked as a veritable caput lupinumto the point of legally permissible annihilation through conquest and annexation. The legal admissibility of war showed how unreal was the borderline between law and lawlessness, between the duty to let live and the right to extinguish. It showed that law obtained only so long as States were willing to tolerate it and that it was left to them to divest themselves of the most fundamental of all duties by one legally authorized arbitraryact.
This glaring gap in the effective validity of international law has been chosen here as an example not only for the reason that it constitutes a weakness much more real than the absence of enforcement or of over- riding international legislation. It has been selected because it throws light upon a phenomenon similar to that created by the law of recognition-assuming always that the prevalent doctrine gives an accurate account of the existing practice. The State is bound by minute rules to respect the sovereignty and independence of other States. But, as in the traditional view of war the State is left to its free discretion by avail- ing itself of the unlimited right of war to assail the very existence of other States, so, in the light of the predominant doctrine of recognition, it is free to decide according to its unfettered discretion and by consulting its own interests only whether another community shall enjoy the rights of sovereignty and independence inherent in statehood. By the simple de- vice of refusing--or possibly of withdrawing--recognition, a State is legally entitled, according to a widely adopted view, to deny the right of independent existence to a political community apparently fulfilling the conditions of statehood.

The position is analogous in the case of recognition of governments. A State participates in the benefits of international law largely through the medium of its government. To decline to recognize the government of a State is to refuse, to a substantial extent, to recognize the State itself and to accord it what is its due in the international sphere. Such a re- fusal implies the denial of normal international intercourse; it results in ignoring the legislative, judicial, and administrative acts of the State whose government has been refused recognition; it entails in many cases the suspension of the operation of treaties concluded by former govern- ments; and it has even been suggested that it deprives the government in question of the capacity to wage war.[2] In the case of a civil war the consequences of that alleged right to grant or refuse recognition according to discretion show themselves in an even more glaring manner. A right thus conceived may, in effect, amount to granting to foreign States a license to withdraw recognition from the lawful government and to bestow it arbitrarily upon the rebels, with all the profound consequences following from that change in the legal status of the two sides.[3] To say,therefore, that the granting of recognition to a new government is a mat- ter of discretion unfettered by legal principle is to maintain that in this matter also the line dividing law and freedom from legal restraint is altogether illusory. Similar consequences in a different sphere follow from the view that in the case of a civil war the recognition of belligerency with all the rights attaching thereto is a matter of pure grace and political convenience on the part of foreign States.
In all these cases the view that recognition is not a function consisting in the fulfilment of an international duty, but a measure of national policy independent of binding legal principle, has had the further result of divorcing recognition from the scientific basis of fact on which all law must ultimately rest. That basis is the assumption that international personality, governmental capacity, and the competence to exercise the rights of a belligerent in a civil war, must all be determined primarily by reference to the actual conditions of power and effectiveness of the authorities claiming recognition in these various capacities.


RECOGNITION– Legal Thinking and Historical Practice

“No element of international policy has gone more askew in the break-up of Yugoslavia than recognition– whether, when, how, under what conditions – of the emerging parts”[4]

There seems to be an underlying controversy regarding the concept of recognition in international law. Israel was recognized by the United States in a matter of minutes following its declaration of independence, but Palestine has ‘a special status’. Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia but refuses to recognize Kosovo. The United Nations recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus on the whole territory of Cyprus, however the Turkish Republic of Northern Republic of Cyprus declared in 1974 has never ceased to exist. Why was the partition of Germany a politically and morally legitimate act after World War II, and forty-five years later it was proven illegitimate and replaced by the unification paradigm? In his critical remarks on Lauterpacht’s “Recognition of States in International Law”, Josef L. Kunz, acknowledges that recognition is indeed a controversial problem that has not been satisfactorily resolved neither in theory nor in practice: “The reason is that recognition “is a subject of enormous complexity, principally because it is an amalgam of political and legal elements in a degree which is unusual for international law.””[5]

The international system, however organized and stable, is not fully resistant to change. While its organization and functionality is based on treaties and charters, the United Nations Charter being the supreme act providing the framework for such organization and building relations between nations and states while preserving world peace and human lives, there are persisting challenges to which precise answers are difficult to be given. The decade - long warfare in Sudan resulted with a somewhat peaceful partition and independence referendum for southern Sudan. The end of the war in Syria could result with the creation of a state for the Kurdish peoples. The plebiscitary vote on independence of Catalonia in Spain could potentially succeed and produce the independent state of Catalonia. The Scottish referendum on independence in the fall of 2014 was only failed by a 1% difference for those in favor of the Union with Great Britain, mostly as a result of central state authority’s involvement and pledges for greater devolution and strengthening of Scotland’s position as a constituent part of the United Kingdom. The annexation of Crimea by Russian troops could end with a new sovereign unit on the territory of the former Soviet Union federation. The events in Syria, Iraq point to the possibility of the emergence of some type of transnational state that would transpose existing internationally recognized territorial boundaries. Such a creation clearly does not claim its right to exist on the Montevideo Declaration on Rights and Duties and States. What should be response of the international community to such an ‘entity’, that tends to revive some sort of a self-styled ancient regime state based primarily on violence and human rights abuse, and not on democratic values and freedom for all.

These are yet a few of the challenges of the international community in the global affairs of the world today which only prove that norms and regulations between states have not succeeded to provide precise and final answers to quests for independence and statehood. This has been the case for centuries in the past and it will most likely remain the case in the future. This is why recognition is such a challenging subject of international law.

What is recognition? How is it defined? Is it a principle, a right, or perhaps just a discretionary decision made individually by States? Is recognition a matter of law or a mere political consideration? Scholars often times refer to the ‘Doctrine of Recognition’. How has it developed? Who makes the decision? When is it legitimate? Can it be rejected or withdrawn? The examples, the nature, and the circumstances under which recognition is extended, seem to imply that recognition implies various meanings and various actions: “The problem of recognition in international law has been the subject of a far-flung practice of states, of many decisions of national and international courts, of many treaties and of an enormous literature.”[6]To those aspiring it, recognition represents a right; to those granting it, recognition is a matter of political evaluation and decision. Recognition is based on normal principles. It is rather rightly termed ‘a controversial principle’, for the contextual bases when it is granted and particularly how it is granted often contradict, are not uniformed, and create further contentions. Somewhere in between comes the law. Recognition is a subject of international law and the fundamental principles of international law must apply in extending or withholding it. According to Brown, “In spite of the comments and theories of the writers on the subject of recognition the simple truth is that it is governed by no rules whatever. In the absence of a supranational state exercising supreme authority the act of recognition is political in nature and the prerogative of an independent sovereign state.

In 1934, John Fischer Williams began his considerations on the doctrine of recognition citing Lorimer, according to whom recognition is ‘the basis of international law’,[7]and went further to explain that “In international law, [therefore], recognition carries with it the clear implication that the recognizing Power has some concern or interest in the subject matter of the recognition.”[8]Williams maintains that the doctrine of recognition provides for “a common system of international rights and duties binding to all members of the Family of Nations.”[9]According to Oppenheim, “the grant of recognition establishes that the new state, in the opinion of existing recognizing states, fulfils the conditions of statehood required by international law,”and therefore “... it is recognition which constitutes the new state as a member of the international community.”Dugard submits that “Recognition is the most maligned and controversial branch of International Law”, and Terret recognizes the fact that “the dividing line between law and politics is often difficult to discern and nowhere more so than in international law”[10]Such theoretical considerations strengthen the position according to which recognition is ultimately a matter of political evaluation and political interests, not so much a matter of mere legal principles.

Ti-Chiang Chen acknowledged in 1951 that the question of recognition arises every time there is a change of government, outbreak of civil war, or a dispute over territories.[11]Chen explains the importance of recognition as essential for the validity of acts of a State in its relations with another State or with the community of States.

Some eighty years ago, the participating governments at the Seventh International Conference of American States, signed in Montevideo, Uruguay, the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States. This Declaration, widely known as the Montevideo Declaration is still considered as the legal basis for the international recognition of States, as it lays out four basic elements for Statehood: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.[12]Not all scholars subscribe to these basic criteria, and some extend the list by also including self-determination, minority rights or the quality of democracy as basic preconditions. However, the four elements of the Montevideo Convention still serve as an indicator of whether a new entity could qualify to become an independent State or not. Article 3 of the Declaration stipulates that “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states.


The act of admission in the Organization of United Nations is rightly considered to be the practical mechanism of extending international recognition to [new] states. The United Nations is where the doctrine remains silent and the procedure takes over, while the political institutions of the United Nations[13]are those that have the authority to decide upon the admission of new members in the world organization.

The United Nations were established in the aftermath of the Second World War in an effort by the countries to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies and massive loss of human lives. It was founded with the objective of securing international peace and security and with the aim to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,”[14]and in order to achieve these goals, “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite [our] strength to maintain international peace and security...”[15]

Membership in the United Nations is regulated in Article 3 of the Charter. This article draws a clear distinction between “the original Members” and states admitted to the Organization. According to Article 3 paragraph 1, “The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with article 110.”[16]

Furthermore, Article 4 describes the procedure for the admission of new Members:

Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendations of the Security Council.[17]

Membership in the United Nations is further classified as an “an important question” for which the General Assembly shall decide by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.[18]

The Charter does in no part speak of “recognition” of new States. Instead, it uses the term “admission”, which indicates that the organization does not deal with the evaluation of the fulfillment of the Montevideo criteria, “subject, inter alia, to the condition that the applicant be a state.[19]This distinction in terms, however, does leave open the question of whether a state could be a state and admitted to the United Nations, and still not be fully recognized by the other members of the international community at a bilateral level. At the same time, it is not totally clear in terms of procedure at what point and based on what criteria the Security Council would recommend to the General Assembly to admit a new member to the organization. Typically, it should look at the fulfillment of the Montevideo Criteria; however the practical cases seem to indicate that this has not been a universal criterion applied with regards to admission. During the first decade of the United Nations, although most of the original members had been recognized as states, there were six states, including India, which at the time of admission had not been fully independent:

“Although India did not become fully independent until 15 August 1947, she had been an original and active member of the League of Nations and it would have been anomalous to exclude her from the United Nations. Similarly, the Philippines did not become fully independent until 4 July 1946, but in the light of her war record and promised independence, it would have been impolitic to refuse her original membership. Syria and Lebanon had both been Mandates under the league of Nations and, although their independence had been declared and generally accepted, final arrangements with the mandatory power, France, had yet to be completed in 1945. The admission of these States to original membership in the United Nations did not therefore seriously undermine the requirement of statehood contained in Article 3 of the Charter.[20]

At the same time, Article 4 paragraph 1 provides that membership to the United Nations is granted to ‘peace-loving’ states as well as states able to carry out the obligations of the Charter. The question remains, however, what objective criteria do member-states use to evaluate that states are in possession of such capabilities, and moreover, that they are peace-loving states? In its advisory opinion of 1948 on Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, the International Court of Justice refers to the Security Council Rules of Procedure for an interpretation of the establishment of the criteria of a ‘peace – loving’ nation: “The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace – loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and accordingly whether to recommend the applicant State for membership.”[21]The Court finds, furthermore, that “Article 4 does not forbid the taking into account of any factor which it is possible reasonable and in good faith to connect with the conditions laid down in that Article. The taking into account of such factors is implied in the very wide and very elastic nature of the prescribed conditions; no relevant political factor – that is to say, none connected with the conditions of admission – is excluded.”[22]The Court in its Opinion acknowledges what it calls the ‘elastic’ nature of the prescribed conditions and indicates that the interpretation of such conditions is not immune to political interpretation.

Dugard is therefore right to conclude that “the questions whether the applicant is a peace-loving State and whether it is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter depends on the discretion of the Security Council and the General Assembly; and the history of the United Nations, particularly during the first decade of its existence, points to the broad interpretations that may be placed upon these conditions by States politically determined to block the admission of applicants judged to favour an alien ideology or to support a rival bloc.”Furthermore, Dugard recognizes that the judicial organ of the United Nations, i.e. the International Court of Justice can do little “to curb the excesses of political decisions exercised through an arbitrary veto.”Indeed, in its 1948 Advisory Opinion, the Court held that “a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, is not juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph I of the said Article.”[23]

While the political realities after the Second World War were such that the statehood criteria could be bypassed and a country could become an original member of the United Nations even without having met the formal requirements, the question remains how to respond to demands for statehood in an ever changing world and what should be the role of the United Nations Organization and the application of the United Nations Charter? The quest for political balance and no impairment of the international system seems to have been and remains the corollary of all times, while political bargaining between the great powers, the original members or the members of the Security Council is an ongoing activity even today. Brown is right to conclude then, that “In spite of the comments and theories of the writers on the subject of recognition the simple truth is that it is governed by no rules whatever. In the absence of a supranational state exercising supreme authority the act of recognition is political in nature and the prerogative of an independent sovereign state.”[24]


Therefore, it is a mechanism that will contribute to lasting peace and security and basic postulates of international law and relations among nations. The longer the postponement, the greater the risk of the Union become a sponsor of lasting instability and frozen conflicts on its own soil. Therefore it is not in the interest of the community to maintain a status-quo position but on the contrary, it must become a stimulating tool to produce a more proactive policy of bringing these new countries to its community, thus ending unresolved disputes on the territory geographically.

[1]G.A. Res. 60/264, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/264 (June 28, 2006) (admitting the Republic of Montenegro as a member of the United Nations). See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26).

[2]In view of the fact that the Government of the United States has not recognized the existence in the Republic of Costa Rica of a de jure or even a legitimately de facto Government, but holds that only the people of Costa Rica can as a moral force set up in that country a government constitutional in character and duly sanctioned by law, it fol- lows naturally that the Government of the United States could not recognize as legally existent any manifestation of such a Government.
"To declare war is one of the highest acts of sovereignty. The Government of Costa Rica being for the Government of the United States legally nonexistent, it follows that so far as the Government of the United States is concerned, no state of war could exist between Costa Rica and the Imperial German Government. Obviously there could be no question so far as this Government was concerned as to signing with Costa Rica the Treaty of Peace of Versailles." Memo of Secretary Lansing to President Wilson, Aug. 16, 1919, 1 Fop- RE.. U. S. 1919 (U. S. Dep't State 1934) 852.
[3]The recognition of the revolutionary government in Spain by Italy and Germany in November, 1936, at the beginning of the civil war. New York Times, Nov. 19, 1936, p. 1,col. .

[4]‘The Macedonian Question’, an editorial published in the Washington Post, 16 May 1992, shortly after the breakout of fighting and warfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina
[5]Alwin V. Freeman, as quoted by Josef L. Kunz, “Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht’s “Recognition of States in International Law””, the American Journal of International Law, Vol.44, No.4 (October 1950), pp.713-719

[6]Josef L. Kunz, “Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht’s “Recognition in International Law””, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.44, No.4, (Oct. 1950), pp.713-719

[7]La Doctrine de la Reconnaissance (1884), 16 Revue De Droit International (1stSer.) p.333, as cited by John Fischer Williams, “Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law”, 47 Harvard Law Review (1933-34), p.776
[8]John Fischer Williams, “Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law”, 47 Harvard Law Review (1933-34), p.777
[10]S. Terret, “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission”, p4
[11]Chen, “The International Law of Recognition: Special Reference to Practice in Great Britain and the States”, obtained via , p.13

[12]Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, 1933, setting the qualifications of a State as a person of international law.
[13]These are the organs of the United Nations as defined in Article 7 of the United Nations Charter: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.
[14]Preamble to the United Nations Charter
[16]United Nations Charter, Chapter II – Membership, Article 3 Paragraph 1
[17]United Nations Charter, Chapter II – Membership, Article 4, Paragraphs 1,2
[18]United Nations Charter, Chapter IV – The General Assembly, Voting, Article 18, Paragraph 2
[19]R. Cohen, “The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.109, No. 8 (Jun., 1961), pp.1127-1171

[20]J. Dugard, “Recognition and the United Nations:, Hersch Lauterpacht memorial Lectures, Cambridge, Grotius Publications Limited, 1987, p. 53 - 54
[21]1948 I.C.J. Reports, 63
[23]1948 I.C.J. Report, 65

[24]Ph. Marshall Brown, “The Recognition of Israel”, the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jul., 1948), pp. 620 - 627


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